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Interethnic Marriages, the Survival
of Women, and the Logics of Genocide
in Rwanda
Anuradha Chakravarty
Department of Government, Cornell University
This article focuses on the gendered dimensions of the genocide in Rwanda. It seeks
to explain why Tutsi women married to Hutu men appeared to have better chances
of survival than Tutsi women married to Tutsi men or even Hutu women married
to Tutsi men. Based on data from a field site in southwest Rwanda, the findings
and insights offered here draw on the gendered, racial, and operational dynamics
of the genocide as it unfolded between April and July 1994.

Introduction
In September 1992, a military commission report in Rwanda officially defined the
‘‘main enemy’’ as ‘‘Tutsis from inside or outside the country’’ and the ‘‘secondary
enemy’’ as ‘‘anyone providing any kind of assistance to the main enemy.’’1 Since the
invasion of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels in 1990, extremist propaganda
had focused on the immutable racial distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsis
were denounced as historic ‘‘invaders’’ who had ‘‘stolen the country.’’ The RPF
attack was cast as a similar attempt, undertaken with the help of Tutsis within
Rwanda, all of whom were, by an extension of this racial logic, pronounced accomplices
of the rebels.2
Despite this undifferentiated notion of ‘‘main enemy,’’ not all Tutsis in a given area
were targeted at the same time, or in similar ways, when the genocide began on
the night of 6 April 1994.3 By the end of April, about half the Tutsi population had
been killed,4 and Tutsi men and boys had been the primary targets.5 Several thousand
Tutsi women and girls were killed in the first month of genocide, but it was from midMay onward that there was a significant rise in Tutsi female deaths. According to
Alison Des Forges, it was likely that a ‘‘decision to kill women had been made at
the national level and was being implemented in local communities.’’6 By the
time genocide was halted in mid-July, between 75 and 80% of the approximately
850,000 dead7 were male.8 For this reason, Rwanda is sometimes referred to as the
land of widows.9
There is a paucity of focused theoretical work or empirical research on the
gendered dimensions of genocide in Rwanda. As a rule, scholarship on the genocide has
focused on its multiple causes, evaluating the role of ethnic hatred and racial ideology
vis-à-vis the role of fear, pressure, opportunism, and poverty; on the role of
international actors; on the mechanisms and patterns of local participation; and on
the diffusion of violence over time and space.10 Valuable information exists, however,
in detailed reports prepared by human-rights organizations on sexual violence
perpetrated against mainly Tutsi but also Hutu women, on the varied roles that
women played as perpetrators of violence, and on estimates of the scale of rape, forced
pregnancies, and the spread of HIV/AIDS.11
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Survivor testimonies and eyewitness accounts in the available literature
suggest that while Tutsi women were not the primary targets in the early stages
of the massacres, they were not treated in an undifferentiated manner. That is, Tutsi
women married to Hutu men appear to have been targeted later than Tutsi women
married to Tutsi men. It also appears that Tutsi women with Hutu husbands escaped
death, rape, or mutilation more often than Tutsi women with Tutsi husbands.
The paucity of large-scale systematic evidence, however, prohibits us from making
conclusive or generalizable arguments from these observations.
Although the scope of this article is limited, in that the validity of these
observations in a single research site cannot conclusively confirm that they hold true
in a general sense across the country, a self-selection problem does not exist: Masaka
sector in southwest Rwanda12 was chosen as a research site for entirely different
reasons, such as proximity to a main highway and a local gacaca tribunal for genocide
crimes that worked without frequent interruptions and down time. Both of these were
important factors, because I was interested in investigating how knowledge about
the genocide was produced at the local level through the operation of gacaca’s
judicial process, while the relative accessibility of Masaka sector made repeat visits
and long-terms stays in the area possible. It was later that I discovered that Tutsi
women married to Hutu men in Masaka sector had been more likely to survive
genocide than Tutsi women married to Tutsi men.
It is worth noting that genocide was carried out at the local level with the
widespread participation of local actors. Therefore, an intensive local-level investigation remains pertinent. This article goes beyond qualitative analysis and ethnographic
empiricism to propose a theoretical explanation drawing on intersections of the
gendered, racial, and operational logics of genocide in Rwanda.
In Masaka sector, of the twelve Tutsi female survivors who were adults in 1994,
ten had been married to Hutu husbands. The other two had Tutsi husbands who were
killed. Of all other mono-ethnic Tutsi marriages, both partners perished.
Approximately seventeen Hutu women had been married to Tutsi men in 1994.
With one exception, all of the Tutsi husbands were killed.
At least three Tutsi men who were adults in 1994 survived the genocide in Masaka.
Of these, one was an elderly man (married to a Hutu woman) who later died of natural
causes, and the two others migrated out of the sector for work. During the period of
field research, there were no adult Tutsi men living in the sector. About ten Tutsi
children survived in 1994. Of these survivors who were not adults in 1994, the majority
are female. Except for one young man who now lives elsewhere, the others are now
young adolescents or in their late teens. Since ethnicity passes down the male line in
Rwanda, all of them had Tutsi fathers. But none of their fathers survived the
genocide.13
I spent several months in Masaka sector, living with ordinary residents and
participating in everyday life. The data for this article are drawn from in-depth
interviews with a representative sample of the population and from transcripts of
eight complete trials for genocide crimes observed at the local gacaca tribunal.14
The accounts given here are reconstructions of events such as the genocide in
Masaka—the data were gathered from different sources and verified for accuracy by
means of cross-checking against other available information. In certain places, the
narratives of respondents are reproduced in their own words. Because of space
constraints, other accounts have been condensed and narrated in the third person to
highlight those details that are relevant for this analysis.
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A Three-Pronged Explanation
Any satisfactory explanation has to go beyond blanket theses such as ethnic hatred
and genocide ideology, because these cannot account for variation in the way Tutsis
were targeted or explain why all Hutus did not participate in the killings.15 In the
following subsection, gendered practices of nationalist or identity-based violence are
examined in order to explain why Tutsi men were primarily targeted in the initial
stages and why it was so difficult for Tutsi males of all ages to survive. The next
subsection shows how gendered constructions of the ethnic ‘‘other’’ help to explain why
Tutsi women were allowed to survive in much higher numbers than male Tutsis. This,
however, does not explain why Tutsi women with Hutu husbands were relatively safe
from physical harm compared to Tutsi women married to Tutsi men. The succeeding
subsection argues that the operational dynamics of genocide at the local level offer a
plausible explanation. The last two subsections explore how this intersection of racial,
gendered, and operational logics of genocide explains the experiences of Hutu women
in interethnic and mono-ethnic marriages.

Targeting Tutsi Men
Adam Jones has argued that mass killing of men has been a ‘‘definitional feature’’ of
genocide and often a ‘‘prelude to the ‘root and branch’ extermination’’ of a
community.16 The reasons for targeting the male population might be the strategic
need to destroy battle-age male non-combatants capable of joining the ranks of enemy
soldiers or to eliminate social elites capable of mobilizing resistance (church leaders,
opinion leaders, and politicians being predominantly male in general). The use of
sexual violence against men makes it possible to inflict humiliation by feminizing the
ethnic ‘‘other’’17; the physical extermination of men can be used, in combination with
other methods, to prevent a community from perpetuating itself.
It is not difficult to find confirming evidence in the case of Rwanda. In the
numerous small-scale massacres of Tutsis during the years of civil war preceding
the genocide, Tutsi men were almost exclusively targeted as potential members of
the RPF.18 Besides killing Tutsi men during the genocide, the perpetrators also
castrated Tutsi male children, sometimes forced adult Tutsi men to have sex with
known HIV-positive women,19 and spared neither the very old nor the very young.20
Because Tutsi men were rarely spared, they were not in a position (in reality, not alive)
to cajole or bargain with perpetrators for the lives of their Tutsi wives or children.

Targeting Tutsi Women: Gendered Constructions of the ‘‘Other’’
The racialization of identity in Rwanda can be traced to the early twentieth century.
Colonial authorities interpreted pre-existing social inequalities in light of the Hamitic
hypothesis (the idea that Tutsis were racially similar to the Europeans and,
thus, allegedly superior to the Negroid Hutu in physiology, intellect, and innate
abilities). Following this logic, the Belgians introduced a race-based census and ethnic
identification cards. Hitherto salient markers of identity such as lineage, clan, and
dialect were gradually subsumed under a racial understanding of social difference,21
and, in the pre-independence era, both Hutu and Tutsi elites appropriated those
elements of the Hamitic hypothesis that best suited their interests.22 The Bahutu
Manifesto, which foreshadowed the establishment of the First Hutu Republic,
pointedly stated that the social problem was the racial problem and should be
understood as the political, economic, and cultural domination of the Tutsi race.
From 1990 onward, the extremist media popularized the same logic, harping on the
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‘‘origins of the criminality of Tutsi’’23 and calling on ‘‘all Hutu to reinforce their
unity.’’24
Decades of institutionalized racism had produced mental maps of racial difference,
concomitant with myths about origins, stereotypes about the ‘‘nature of the Tutsi’’
and the ‘‘nature of the Hutu,’’25 and imputation of a historic agenda of conquest by
Tutsi as a race. The extremist media—Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines
(RTLM) and the magazine Kangura—represented the Tutsi as an ambitious, ruthless,
and tricky race. Tutsi women in particular were portrayed in an array of forms.
Historically perceived as women of the royal courts or the upper classes, they were cast
as exotic sexual objects beyond the reach of the ordinary Hutu. If a Tutsi woman
deigned to marry a Hutu man, it was said to be a conspiracy of her male co-ethnics to
use her feminine charms to trick Hutu men. During the genocide, Hutu males were
targeted for propaganda and innuendo suggesting that they could now enjoy these
exotic and arrogant Tutsi women, provided they were perpetually on guard against
their treacherous nature. It is interesting that there were no specific orders for rape,
nor were lists compiled of those to be raped (unlike the lists that were drawn up of
those marked for death); nevertheless, innuendo, jokes, and propaganda were
interpreted as intended.26
It was standard practice for female Tutsis to be allowed to live and be abused as sex
slaves, either by force or by a mutual compact that traded sexual services for survival.
It is also true, though, that thousands of female Tutsis were raped before being
killed. The word kubohoza (‘‘to liberate’’) was used for the act of rape. This word had
been used in the context of the launch of multi-party politics in 1991 that marked
the end of President Juvénal Habyarimana’s single-party dictatorship of the National
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) party. At that time
it referred to a violent campaign by the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR)
party that forced MRND officials to switch their political affiliation to the MDR.27
It was also associated with the coercive appropriation of land and resources and
reflected a tendency to use violence in the pursuit of political ends. The use of the same
word for rape indicates that sexual violence and forcible impregnation were
consciously associated with politics and the extremist Hutu Power agenda.28 (Here it
is worth noting that feminist scholars have shown how rape and impregnation
of enemy women is part of war and an attempt at ethnic cleansing.29 In the
former Yugoslavia, for example, raped women were kept in custody until they could no
longer abort, and similar stories spread in both Serbia and Croatia about how ‘‘‘others’
had raped ‘our’ women, and wanted to spoil our nation.’’30)

Tutsi Women in Interethnic Marriages
To argue that Hutu men were not targeted and were therefore able to protect their
Tutsi wives would be to obscure the complex reality of genocide. Many ordinary Hutus
were specifically singled out for violence, including old enemies of locally powerful
ge´nocidaires, social deviants such as thieves and sorcerers,31 and sometimes the rich.
Hutu men married to Tutsi women were also vulnerable targets because of the social
construction of female Tutsis as spies for their male co-ethnics. The first of the
‘‘Hutu Ten Commandments’’ printed in the extremist magazine Kangura announced
that any Hutu man who had a Tutsi female as wife, mistress, secretary, or even friend
would be considered a traitor.32 As a result, a Tutsi wife could become a source of
embarrassment, if not a deadly liability, for a Hutu man among his co-ethnics and
the focal point for considerable pressure from Hutu family members who felt
238

The Logics of Genocide in Rwanda

unsafe harboring an icyitso (‘‘accomplice’’). In fact, many Hutu husbands abandoned
their Tutsi wives or handed them over to their killers without protest. Tellingly,
in Nazi Germany in the 1930s, Christian husbands were similarly pressured to divorce
Jewish wives and divorce cases were on the rise.33
Although interethnic marriages had traditionally been a way of cementing ties
and building relationships based on mutual exchange between Hutu and Tutsi
families, the institution was subject to intense scrutiny in the genocidal propaganda.
Radical nationalist projects derive legitimacy from focusing on questions of racial
purity, origin, and genealogy, where blood and semen are the pure fluids that transmit
racial belonging, moral purity, and spiritual integrity; if contaminated, they are
believed to transmit disease and decay.34 The fear of interethnic marriages stemmed
from concerns about destruction of the nation through the racially impure progeny
of mixed couples. There was also paranoia about the danger posed by an ‘‘elusive
enemy’’ who could not be identified, despite being among them, because the differences
were supposedly biological and ‘‘hidden’’—not cultural, linguistic, or even physiological
in any obvious fashion.35 Warnings such as ‘‘Tutsi, don’t try to hide yourselves’’
appeared in issues of Kangura as early as the winter of 1990/1991, referring to Tutsis
figuratively as hiding behind their Hutu spouses but also directed metaphorically at
ibiymanyi (those of mixed parentage).36
All Hutu men in mixed marriages could not save their Tutsi wives, but those
able to do so were successful, in large part, because of the operational logic of genocide
at ground level. Recent research has shown how ordinary people in Rwanda were
mobilized by local networks of family, friends, and peers to join groups of attackers
through a mix of coercion and persuasion.37 The mobs were large, the most common
size of a group ranging between eleven and thirty people.38 In Masaka sector, there
was a smaller core group whose members split up and mobilized larger groups
for different attacks.
From my interviews with Hutu men who were able to save their Tutsi wives from
rape or death, what stands out prominently is the fact that they were acquainted with
one or more of the people at the center of the attack. This allowed them to negotiate
and strike a bargain with the mob, usually involving the exchange of a cow or other
livestock or property for the life of the woman. Even if the Hutu husband did not
recognize anyone in the mob, a bargain was possible if a friend or neighbor who rallied
around the besieged family happened to know one or more of the key actors among the
attackers and stepped in to mediate.
The lives of Tutsi men were rarely spared. Thus, in mono-ethnic Tutsi marriages,
the Tutsi husband was not in a position either to save himself or to protect his wife.
In Masaka, the usual practice was for the death squads to grab the family’s livestock;
steal bricks, tiles, and furniture from the house; and kill the couple and the children
after ascertaining that there were no further assets that had been hidden away.
Families split up and went into hiding, each member on his or her own, to maximize
chances of survival. If someone was discovered, attackers coerced information about
the location of the livestock and other property owned by the family—and then, having
verified that the things were truly where he or she said they were, killed the victim.39
In contrast, a deal between Hutu men with Tutsi wives and Hutu perpetrators
was still possible, particularly if three conditions were fulfilled: first, one or more of the
key actors in the mob happened to be acquainted with the Hutu husband or with
someone who supported the husband’s position; second, the Hutu husband was on
the spot when the attack occurred; and, third, he was willing to take risks. It must
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be understood that each argument with an armed and hostile mob constituted a risk,
and each insistent plea for reconsideration meant that the Hutu husband was courting
danger and risked being physically assaulted, if not killed.
Still other elements went into making such a compact between Hutu men durable.
If the Hutu protector happened to be a man who was well respected or well liked in
the community, the bargain was sealed with the attackers’ promise, on their word
of honor, that they would not renege on the deal. The situation changed dramatically if
a Hutu man hid his Tutsi wife in the bush, or in someone else’s home, and she
happened to be discovered. It was unlikely that her Hutu hosts would risk the ire of
the mob by attempting to negotiate or resist. If the hosts did not personally know
anyone involved in the attack, there was also little possibility of bargaining to spare
the woman’s life. In the event that the hosts did resist, they were usually threatened
and sometimes beaten up. If the Tutsi woman was found hiding alone in the bush,
she could be raped or killed immediately.

Hutu Women in Interethnic Marriages
The above account provides evidence that Tutsi men could not protect themselves,
as they were denied a chance to bargain for their lives. Neither could Hutu wives
of Tutsi men do much to protect their husbands, because there were no readily
available templates for such social roles of women as negotiating partners with men.
Rwandan men expected their women to be hardworking and submissive, and women
traditionally had little access to education, jobs, or inheritance or ownership rights
to property.40 In Masaka, not only were the Tutsi husbands and children killed,
their houses were also destroyed and property looted.
Hutu women in interethnic marriages were also perceived as traitors and were
often raped or beaten up as punishment by male co-ethnics. Nationalist projects
depend on maintaining the boundaries of ‘‘their’’ nation. This requires constant
policing and tight control of women’s sexuality, marriage, and reproduction—whether
in Rwanda, in the former Yugoslavia, or in Nazi Germany.41 Serb and Croat women
in mixed marriages bore the brunt of Serb and Croat nationalisms, respectively:
Serb women married to Croat men suffered insults thrown at them by ethnic Serbs,
such as ‘‘Croatian prostitutes’’ or ‘‘Ustaša mothers’’; Croat women married to Serb men
were called such names as ‘‘Serbian prostitutes’’ and ‘‘Četnik mothers’’ by ethnic
Croatians.42 In Nazi Germany, non-Jewish women guilty of ‘‘racial misconduct’’ under
the Nuremberg Laws were photographed and their names and addresses publicly
displayed. Because male Jews were portrayed as sexual predators in Nazi discourse,
most cases dealing with ‘‘race defilement’’ laws involved Jewish men and non-Jewish
women.43

Hutu Women in Mono-ethnic Marriages
Like every other social actor, Hutu women with Hutu husbands largely failed to
extend support or comfort to Tutsi women faced with grave danger. Recent advances in
feminist theory alert us to the risks of simplistic and essentialized notions of
‘‘sisterhood’’ and ‘‘women’s solidarity’’ across ethnic and class divides. On the one hand,
there are often real ideological or political differences between identity-based groups or
class formations, and the real question for women may well be how they can bridge
these differences without denying them. On the other hand, women may be too
invested or rooted in these positions to shift or move across the chasm to locate
common interests and build on them.44
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Feminist analyses show how women are both mobilized and oppressed by their
‘‘own’’ nationalist movements, which glorify traditional gender codes and male
power.45 Jean Bethke Elshtain argues that by slipping into idealized roles such as
the ‘‘spartan mother’’ or the ‘‘beautiful soul,’’ women have ‘‘more often than not’’
exhorted their men to violence in the national interest and honored them for their
actions.46 Expected to be patriotic and comforting wives, German Christian women
provided a soothing family environment for their men to come home to from their jobs
in the concentration camps and did not confront them with questions about the war,
the Jews, or politics in general—even when they heard rumors or knew from different
sources about what was going on.47 In Rwanda, the extremist magazine Kangura
conferred upon Hutu women the dubious distinction of being ‘‘more suitable and more
conscientious in their roles as woman, spouse and mother’’ and urged them to wean
Hutu men away from the charms of Tutsi women.48 The emotional insecurity and envy
this induced may have prevented Hutu women from feeling more sympathetic
toward the plight of Tutsi women. In fact, many Hutu women played an active part in
the genocide. They refused refuge to Tutsis in need, betrayed those hidden in their
homes, acted as informants, and also killed. As loyal Hutus, some prominent
Hutu women donned military fatigues and organized the massacres in their areas.49
The example of Masaka sector cautions against over-generalization in any direction.
Sometimes polygamous Hutu men hid the Tutsi wife in the home of the Hutu wife.
Perhaps these women were motivated by genuine sympathy for the plight of the
Tutsi wives, or perhaps they did not want to incur their husband’s displeasure and
submitted to his wish that they extend refuge. In Masaka, at any rate, among the
surviving Tutsi women married to Hutu men, it was rare to encounter a case where
they attributed their survival primarily to being hidden in the Hutu wife’s home.

Genocide in Masaka Sector
There is little evidence that all perpetrators were motivated by a genocidal impulse,
but it would be problematic to underestimate the extent of fear and paranoia
that ordinary Hutu felt toward the ethnic ‘‘other’’ as a whole in the context of the
RPF invasion and the unflagging hysteria broadcast over the RTLM. Tutsi residents of
Masaka were suspected of secretly harboring sympathy for the rebels. A few Tutsi
individuals were singled out, and rumors began to circulate about their allegedly
active support for the military effort of the RPF. One of them, John, had become
the object of much speculation. During my interviews, many respondents mentioned
that people used to say that John hated Hutus. Many had apparently believed
that documents proving his support to the rebels had been found and that John was
expecting to be rewarded with political office after the RPF victory.
With the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991, various political parties had
organized meetings in Biryogo, a trading center an hour’s journey by foot from
Masaka. The MDR party had enjoyed a popular resurgence in this area because of its
status as the party of the founding father of the first Hutu Republic and its association
with the Hutu of the south. Some young men from Masaka had been sent to a
neighboring district for military training. Respondents said they discovered only later
that these people had been trained as Interahamwe, the feared youth militia.50
Most people clearly recalled an incident they identified as the first act of genocide
in the area. The night of 6 April had been a tense one for the community. They had
heard of the assassination of President Habyarimana on the radio, and the newscast
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had held the RPF responsible. In the early hours of 7 April, a Tutsi businessman who
lived in Biryogo was killed.
That morning some people came to our sector from Biryogo saying that Michel had
been killed. They were looking for John because they said he was helping the
Inkotanyi.51 We had been sitting in Alex’s bar at the gasantere. They informed us that
people were taking beans, sugar, and other things from Michel’s shop and many people
from here went to see what they could take.52

The gasantere came up as a recurrent motif in peoples’ narratives in the interviews
and also in their testimonies at the gacaca tribunal. Gasantere are spaces at the
heart of community life at the grassroots level.53 Within the gasantere there are bars
serving alcohol and meat, small shops, and a weekly market attracting local farmers
and sellers from the nearest trading center. These centers became places where local
strongmen orchestrating the killings met with ordinary perpetrators. Some meetings
were restricted to an inner circle, whose members were well known in Masaka for their
high visibility during the genocide and their leadership of mob attacks at multiple
sites in the sector. Other meetings were open to the public, and people would drift
in and out.
Information was pooled about the number of Tutsis killed and how many
remained. People vied for the leaders’ attention and provided information about
possible hiding places of fugitives. The leaders divided those who gathered around
them (in bars and other meeting places) into groups and sent them on specific
missions.54 Sometimes a mob from another sector would venture into Masaka, merge
with the local groups if they happened to meet on the hills, and go on an attack
together.55 In the evening, stolen cows or goats would be slaughtered and the
gasantere became sites for feasting and swapping stories about the day’s events.
On the aforementioned day, news about Michel’s death had spread quickly as people
returned home with the looted items.
It was Thursday. Around noon, the old woman came to my house. She said, ‘‘my child,
our time has come’’ . . . They hid in the sorghum fields that night.56

‘‘The old woman’’ referred to was an elderly Tutsi woman who had a Tutsi husband
and a large family. The family lived near the interviewee. Except for one daughter,
Odette, everybody had gone to hide in the bush that night. Odette’s mutilated body,
with her breasts cut off, was discovered the next morning:
I had heard loud noises and people were shouting as they went by on this road but it
was dark. I did not know who they were. The family returned the next morning and
they called us after finding her body. Some of us helped to bury her.57

Christopher Taylor has argued that techniques of cruelty derived from a meaningful
‘‘mythic logic’’ in which Tutsi were thought of as a harmful ‘‘blockage’’ requiring
excision from the body politic to restore the nation to health. The racial logic had been
organically mapped onto concepts of sickness (blockage) and health (restoration of
flow) in traditional medicine. Victims were thrown into rivers, as if to represent the
flowing out of impurity, and the dead were piled up in pit latrines as if the nation had
relieved itself of bodily wastes. Breast oblation of Tutsi women and castration of Tutsi
men symbolically represented attempts to ‘‘block’’ the flow of bodily fluids necessary to
reproduce and sustain life.58
For the vast majority of people in Masaka, it was several days before they realized
that Tutsi were the intended targets. Initially, both Hutu and Tutsi had been afraid of
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spending nights at home and went to hide in the fields. The morning of 8 April was
described as follows:
There had been attacks during the night in other cells also but nobody was killed
there . . . We saw that only homes of Tutsi were burning . . . Our cows had been stolen.
Next morning, I got information about who had taken our cows. We went there and got
many of our cows back.59

Neither was there much awareness, in those first few days, that the violence had
been set in motion by government leaders at the highest level and that government
offices were not going to be sanctuaries for the Tutsi. Tutsis who managed to survive
the roadblocks and get to the district office were killed there.60
We had gone to inform the conseiller about Odette’s death, but he was having many
problems dealing with the situation. The homes of his neighbors were burning. He told
us to go to the district to get help.61

Many Tutsis had died in Masaka by the time the weekend was over. Mono-ethnic
Tutsi families had been targeted first. As mentioned above, families often split up to
maximize their chances of survival and went into hiding separately. Those who were
found were killed. Interethnic couples in which the husband was Tutsi were also
attacked, and the husband and Tutsi children were killed. Tutsi wives of Hutu
husbands were hunted last.
Many Hutu respondents said that they understood after this that ‘‘Tutsi had been
given up to be killed,’’ meaning not so much that the government had ordered the
killings but that the government would do nothing to step in and prevent Tutsis
from being killed. They did not deny the involvement of local residents but blamed
unemployed youth and soldiers from ‘‘elsewhere,’’ as well as death squads from
neighboring sectors, for the actual killings. However, based on information pieced
together from trial testimonies at the gacaca proceedings, it appears that the initial
attacks were orchestrated by core groups that were highly mobile and were trained
and equipped for killing. These key actors successfully activated their local networks,
attracted a mass following by providing ample opportunities for plunder, and coerced
the unwilling. There was often overlapping membership across various groups.
But when they went on attacks together, peer pressure and common experiences
of brutality forged a similar mindset and a certain loyalty to the squad. For instance,
the vocabularies of participants in the attacks reveal the use of hunting metaphors
to refer to search-and-kill operations.62

Stories of Survival
In this section, the experiences of two Tutsi women married to Hutu men will be
discussed. Jill did not survive the genocide, and the account of her death contrasts
sharply with the story of Chantal’s narrow escape.
Chantal had worked out a routine. She would hide in the bush during the day
and slip back, under cover of darkness, to spend the night at home with her husband,
Paul, and their children. One night they heard the shouts of an approaching mob.
Paul urged Chantal to slip away through the back door and hide in the sorghum fields.
The stalks of sorghum were several feet tall and provided reasonably good cover in the
dark. The attackers demanded that Chantal be turned over to them, but Paul
responded that she had run away weeks ago and was probably dead by now. They
refused to believe the story and searched the entire house. They held machetes at
the throats of the children and threatened to kill them if Paul did not tell them
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about Chantal’s whereabouts. Among those leading the attack were a few people
that Paul knew well; he had often shared drinks with them and visited their homes
in the past. These people insisted they had a reliable tip that Chantal was
alive and was being hidden by her husband. Paul began to bargain for a settlement
at this point.
Roused by the shouts and the cries, a Hutu neighbor came up to the house and
supported Paul’s plea that the mob take the only cow the family owned and spare
Chantal’s life. This neighbor also knew the leaders of the group. It came out during
the gacaca trials that he had participated in other attacks with these very same
people, and that was how he knew them—but at the time, it was fortunate for Paul
that the neighbor stepped up to bargain on his behalf with the mob. The two men
demanded a guarantee that the mob would not renege on their agreement and return
to kill Chantal later. The leaders pledged in writing that because Paul had ‘‘only one
person who was Tutsi—the wife,’’ and because this ‘‘Tutsi bears children who are
Hutu,’’63 they would not attack his house. They also promised on their word of honor to
prevent other groups from targeting the couple.
Jill was not so fortunate. Her husband had hidden her in the home of his trusted
Hutu friends in another cell. She had been hiding in the space between the roof and
a room’s ceiling with her child for several weeks. The first group that attacked the
home of her elderly Hutu hosts said that they had been informed about an icyitso
(accomplice) hiding there, but they did not discover her up in the roof space. The Hutu
hosts said they suspected that one of Jill’s neighbors had seen her at their home and
tipped off the attackers. Jill and her child were discovered during the second search
of the house a few days later.
Jill’s husband used to scout around the area looking out for attackers. It is not
clear whether someone had identified him; some of the attackers discovered him and
hit him with the blunt edge of a machete. The bulk of that mob came from a
neighboring sector, and neither Jill’s husband nor the Hutu hosts knew the leaders
of the attack. The child ran to the father, and the two escaped. Jill was killed
immediately in the front yard, and her hosts buried her nearby. Some attackers
pursued the father and child but could not find them. The child remained with an old
Hutu woman until July.
The chances of escaping rape or death shrank dramatically if the intended victims
were discovered and did not have a Hutu protector present who not only had some
degree of familiarity with the leaders of the mob but was also willing to take some
personal risks in the victims’ defense. Tutsi women were saved when their
Hutu husbands were tipped off about impending attacks by reliable friends who
were in cahoots with other perpetrators or when Hutu husbands were able to procure
Hutu identity cards through powerful contacts in the area or to negotiate a deal
that might preserve the lives not only of their Tutsi wives but also of other Tutsi
relatives for at least another day.
When all other inducements failed, the argument remained that Tutsi women
married to Hutu men gave birth to Hutu children. Early in the genocide, an elderly
Hutu man saved the lives of two young nieces, daughters of his Hutu sister who
had married a Tutsi man. The husband had been killed, but the old man intervened
and argued that the lives of the girls should be spared because they would grow up to
be the wives of Hutu men. The leader of this mob was related to the old man.
Unconvinced that the disheveled children were indeed girls, the attackers demanded
that they strip so they could be sure the argument was reasonable. As the naked
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children cowered on the floor in a kneeling position, the old man argued and reasoned
until the attackers finally left. He then dug a deep trench in his banana plantation,
where he hid and fed the girls until the genocide came to an end three months later.

Concluding Notes
This article has tried to cover considerable ground using a three-pronged explanation
drawing on the racial, gendered, and operational dynamics of genocide in Rwanda.
There is a great need to focus on the experiences of victims, survivors, and perpetrators
as gendered actors. People depended on each other for survival in complicated ways—
the specifics of the situation when faced with a death squad, prior relationships
and mutual understandings among Hutu and between Hutu and Tutsi during
such interactions—and each situation was always mediated by gender considerations.
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